Tuesday, 22nd April 2025.

Posted on Saturday, 26th September 2009 by Michael

A little command line FU for you.  Small but effective Free IPS and Firewall.

First off here are a few caveats that I need to mention before I get bombarded by people complaining that it does not always work.

  1. This requires a state full connection IE. icmp will not get detected.
  2. The connection may get missed if it is only 1 packet IE. Netsend.
  3. Since this uses a loop there may be a delay and you may miss the connection.

This all started when last Friday my computer popped up a message saying it was about to reboot and one of my new co workers started laughing at my displeasure so I knew he did something. Turns out he was just learning how to use Pstools to execute commands and other things.  If you do not know what Pstools are I suggest you Google it as they are some powerful free tools written by a security researcher and purchased by Microsoft.  For those that know what Pstools are and are asking yourself why he has admin to my machine in the first place, the answer is simple we are members of the security team we have admin over all machines in the domain (not domain admin) so we can do our job duties when asked. We will leave it at that, knowing that if I was allowed to and able to I would remove everyone from my machine that did not need access to it.

Normally I would have just laughed along with him but I was working on a report and this basically made me pull out all stops. To buy me some time and offer a quick retribution I created a bat file with the following code in it and placed it in his user profile start up.

@echo off

psshutdown.exe -m “HAHA”

Note I did not have to supply the path to the psshutdown command as my co worker was nice enough to make my job easier and put Pstools into his environment for me.

The command above will basically display the message HAHA as it countdowns 20 seconds before shutting down his machine. By placing it in his user profile startup it would shutdown the machine every time he logged in. I did it this way so any one of the team could still log in and fix the machine in case he could not figure this out.

Once this was done I executed the command psshutdown.exe \\HIS_IP –m “HAHA” manually to start the fun.  Once he realized that every time he was to log in his machine was to reboot. I informed him if you want to hack you need to learn how to protect against hacks and how to investigate compromised machines. I told him to think about what is happening and what could be causing it to happen.  After a few tries he finally figured it out and corrected the issues.

This leads me into why I am writing this article and the code that you are probably here to see. After him rebooting me and knowing that it could happen again at any given time I started pondering different ways I could detect and counter future attempts without having to purchase any software or installing any tools from internet.  I knew in Linux I could use the netstat command and grep to find his IP when a connection is made to me and then pipe that IP into another command such as adding it to the host.deny list or to a firewall rule or even going as far as using metaploit to attack him back automatically. But unfortunately we do not run Linux desktop environments so I was stuck with a windows environment and basic knowledge of windows scripting. I find it annoying that I could write a Linux shell script that could take over the world (not really but you get the point) in my sleep but it takes me a few days of research and trial and errors to write a windows batch file. I think most of it has to deal with the fact I just never really needed to do them as often as I have had to do them on Linux and when I have I usually just used Perl or CGYWIN but I degress. So based on what I know I could do on Linux I started to think about what I could do on windows to offer a layer of protection and I came up with this with help from another co-worker:

@echo off

:top

for %%a in (192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.4) do call :SubRoutine %%a

goto top

:SubRoutine

netstat -an | find “%1”

if “%errorlevel%” NEQ “0” goto end

echo “ATTACKER DETECTED”

psshutdown.exe -m “HAHAHA your bad” \\%1

goto end

:end

This script will basically continue to run monitoring the netstat command output every second to look for the IP addresses I have supplied to it. If the IP is found it will give error code 0 meaning it was successful and then execute the psshutdown command against that box stopping the attack and shutting down the attacker.

Now I know what you are thinking, this only works if you have admin on their box and you are correct. This also does not assume they are not attacking you and are actually connecting to you for a business need. So let’s first address the issue of you not being admin and what options you are then left with to protect yourself.  Unfortunately the windows firewall is not very useful it takes all or nothing approach and does not allow individual IP or port blocking. It basically says if on and no exception then block everything. So to administrate something like that from a batch file on the fly is not very sufficient.  Actually windows itself truelly lacks the ability to easily and quickly respond. There is no host.deny or Iptables or service.deny like in Linux. You could possibly learn how to use PKI and IPSEC ; and right rules to do that stuff in there based on systems though that is extremely tough for most windows users.

This led me to search on the internet for a way to close connections via the windows command line. Several of the tools I found such as TCPKill or WinTCPKill were automatically deleted by McAfee because they are considered hacking tools. So I continued to look for a tool that would work and was safe for use, not saying those other tools are not safe though McAfee is a requirement here.  The tool I found was CurrPorts by the guys over at http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/cports.html . Using this tool let’s take a look at what the code will now look like:

@echo off

:top

for %%a in (192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.4) do call :SubRoutine %%a

goto top

:SubRoutine

netstat -an | find “%1”

if “%errorlevel%” NEQ “0” goto end

echo “ATTACKER DETECTED”

cports.exe /close * * %1 *

goto end

:end

As you can see above we replaced the “psshutdown” command with the “cports.exe” command. The syntax above uses the /close flag which closes established connections. The * * refers to the local host and the source port. The asterisk allows for wildcards. The %1 is the IP address we want to close and the last * is for the remote port. This seems to work 99% of the time. In our testing we noticed that if a person tried to connect to a port this killed the connection. If they did something like an http request there was a chance we missed the connection since it is not on going. We also noticed that it did not catch share access. We did notice it stopped logins, net cat, telnet, ftp, pstools and more.

Here is a screenshot of the attack without getting blocked by my script:

allowed

Here is a screenshot of the attack being blocked by my script. As you can see I am sending a “RST” flag to the attacker to reset their connection which basically kills the handshake and connection:

deny

Now that we addressed not having administrator access and still being able to help block unwanted attacks let’s look at extending this script to be able to capture the port as well. This will be useful as you will see shortly.

@echo off

:top

for %%a in (192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.4) do call :SubRoutine %%a

goto top

:SubRoutine

for /f “tokens=2” %%a in (‘netstat -an^|find “%1″‘) do set IPnPort=%%a

for /f “tokens=1-2 delims=:” %%b in (‘echo %IPnPort%’) do (

set IP=%%b

set Port=%%c

)

set IPnPort=

if “%IP%”==”” goto end

if “%Port%”==”” goto end

echo ATTACKER DETECTED from %IP% on Port %Port%

cports /close * * %1 %Port%

for %%a in (IP Port) do set %%a=

goto end

:end

The code above allows us to search for the IP address and when the IP is detected it will save the value IP:PORT into the temp variable %IPnPort% it will then run that variable through one more for loop to get the IP and port as two separate variables in this case %%b and %%c which is then turned in the variables %IP% and %Port%. Once we have these two variables we can do a multitude of things. In the sample above we used the variables to specify the IP and port to have cports.exe close. Even though we could of just used an *. In theory we could add another for loop that contained a list of allowed ports and if %Port% was equal to an allowed port it would not kill the connection.

We can also use another third party tool called plink which is part of the putty suite of tools. Plink is a self contained executable that allows you to use the same protocols you find in Putty but via the command line. It also has a very useful flag that allows for a lot of power. The “-m” flag will allow you to send a configuration to a box. For an example we could have our script above use the echo command to write firewall rules to a txt file. We can then use Plink to connect to the firewall and write the rules to the firewall providing an instant protection scheme.  This is extremely helpful for those that run Juniper Netscreen (SSG or earlier) firewalls or CISCO Pix / ASA firewalls. I am not going to cover the syntax for adding rules to the firewalls via the command line for those two firewalls in this paper but I will give you an example. Let’s take the above code and remove the “cports /close” line and add this line instead.

echo “ set %IP% any eq %Port% deny log” >> fw-rules.txt

echo “set any %IP% eq %Port% deny log”  >> fw-rules.txt

echo “wr mem” >> fw-rules.txt

plink USERNAME@HOSTNAME -pw PASSWORD -m fw-rules.txt

>> fw-rules.txt

This code will basically create the firewall rules to deny all connections inbound and outbound to the IP address and port you specified via the variables. Once again the syntax of the rules is not correct but it gives you the insight on what can be done. All you have to do is echo into the fw-rules.txt file any commands you need for your firewall.

To expand this script you can use one other third party tool called “wget” there is a windows port that can be found at http://gnuwin32.sourceforge.net/packages/wget.htm. With this tool you can download lists of blocked IP addresses from different sites on the internet and incorporate it into your script. So if the script detects one of these malicious IP’s are trying to connect to you can auto block it and log it. To do this we can alter the code like this:

@echo off

wget http://somesite.com/ip.txt

:top

for /f %%a in (ip.txt) do call :SubRoutine %%a

goto top

:SubRoutine

for /f “tokens=2” %%a in (‘netstat -an^|find “%1″‘) do set IPnPort=%%a

for /f “tokens=1-2 delims=:” %%b in (‘echo %IPnPort%’) do (

set IP=%%b

set Port=%%c

)

set IPnPort=

if “%IP%”==”” goto end

if “%Port%”==”” goto end

echo ATTACKER DETECTED from %IP% on Port %Port%

ATTACK CODE GOES HERE

for %%a in (IP Port) do set %%a=

goto end

:end

The code above will download a list of known malicious bad sites and monitor connection attempts from those IP addresses against your computer. It will respond to the connection attempt based on the response you want to use. I have give n you several possible responses throughout this paper though don’t limit yourself to those. Use your imagination to expand on this code to make it work for you.

I want to thank you all for reading this and if you have any questions or comments please feel free to contact me. I also want to give special thanks to RunCmd aka Neil for his killer windows scripting skills and patience in helping me.

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

For years now we have been using Joomla as our Content Management System but we have decided to stream line all our sites to use word press instead. Please bear with us as we update links and content to work with the new CMS. We are also working on a new logo and will hopefully have that done and uploaded with in the next 72 hours.

Thanks

Michael

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

BlackBerry Firewall guide

A few months ago I wrote for Informit.com and had my buddy Seth Fogie publish my article that I wrote on the BlackBerry Firewall. You can find the article here:

http://www.informit.com/guides/content.aspx?g=security&seqNum=348

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

Authentication Proxies: Secure or Not?

A while back I wrote on cached credentials and proxy authentication in regards to spyware. Well I rewrote the paper and cleaned it up a bit. I then had informit.com publish it for me. to see it check out the url below.  This one includes the .net code to make it work.

http://www.informit.com/guides/content.aspx?g=security&seqNum=350

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

Fun with Poison Ivy

Poison Ivy is a remote access Trojan (Tool) that can be found at the following URL: http://poisonivy-rat.com and a support forum can be found here http://ratforge.net/forums/ . Please note that these are Trojans and www.digitaloffensive.com nor any of its staff are responsible for any use or misuse that you do with these files.

Recently I had the opportunity to take a close look at the poison ivy rat and run it through a real world scenario in a controlled lab environment. The tool comes as a single exe that allows you to build a server executable from variables you select in the GUI configuration under the new server option. Neither the client nor the server was detected by Norton, McAfee, AVG or trend. This may have been that the version I was using was released only a day earlier.  I did find it a bit weird that inside Vmware that it would not run and would constantly crash. This made me think right away that the creator did not want their code analyzed but a quick Google showed that many people had this issue which was quickly fixed by disabling DEP.

One of the biggest reasons I loved this Trojan so much was that it provided us with a shoveled shell / connection. This means that no matter what ports where open inbound on their firewall we were guaranteed access because most of them were not doing egress filtering.  Poison Ivy provided an easy and repeatable server creation process using profiles to easily save and quickly load your favorite configurations. The wizard walks you through each step asking you what you would like to choose. Screen 1 we created our connections which is where we put in the phone home IP or IP’s as well as the shared password. Screen 2 walks you through the install options: IE. Run on startup, place in registry, place in active control, copy itself to folders and more. The third screen provides the advance features options. Here we can change its mutex name so we can run multiple instances of poison ivy on each machine, inject the Trojan into the browser, make it persistent, inject it into running process and my favorite hide in ADS (alternate data streams, thank you Microsoft). The 4th menu allows you to add additional build features such as an external packer to hide it from AV better. The final screen is actual generation of the Trojan server executable.

In the lab we used core impact as well as several other commercial and non commercial exploit tools to gain access to the machines and install poison ivy. Once we had poison ivy installed we were able to view the users screen in near real time by changing the screen shot capture to 5 seconds (don’t suggest doing this over a internet connection), record all the key logs they typed, spawn remote shells, control processes and services as well as countless other things. One of the other real good things it did was to show us in red every place it had hooked in so we can make sure we did not accidentally kill it while killing other processes or files. Once installed poison ivy was able to maintain our access through the day even when it was killed it would re-spawn itself and connect back to us letting us know it was alive.
The only down fall of Poison Ivy was that since it is connect back Trojan the user has the ability to find our IP and to block it in the firewall. Though there are several ways around this. The one that is built into Poison Ivy is to be able to update the code on the fly by replacing the exe with a newly compiled one allowing it to talk back to a new IP or FQDN.

In short I would like to give kudos to the Poison Ivy team for a fine crafted tool and for supplying us several hours of fun while remaining UN detected by AV.

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

CACHED CREDENTIALS, PROXY AUTHENTICATION and SPYWARE OH MY!

Recently a client of mine and I had a long winded debate about the dangers of not protecting machines from spyware and other malware. The client swore up and down that since they had an authenticating proxy that required the windows cached credentials to access the internet that they were protected. They believed that the proxy prevented the spyware and other malware from being able to phone data home as the spyware would not have access to the cache credentials to access the internet. We spent a lot of time searching for spyware or other malware that were known that could use windows cached credentials and could not find any. The results that we did come up with were articles on how using an authenticating proxy helps cuts down on spyware and other malware as they cannot phone home.  Even though all the data was pointing to me being wrong I knew if it did not currently exist that as spyware evolved it would exist.

Even though I continued to argue my points and tried to provide relevant supporting data to back my concerns up they were still firm that spyware is not an issue. So I set forth to prove them wrong. I remembered back in the day when I use to write applications in Visual Basic that you could make a web browser in just a few minutes. Visual Basic allows you to do this through the web browser component, which uses the Internet Explorer engine. With this in mind I formulated my first theory. The theory was if it used Internet Explorer then it should use cached credentials to authenticate too without the need to steal them or anything else. To test this out I wrote a quick web browser using the web component in Visual Basic. Once I completed the code I disabled the proxy in Internet Explorer to make sure that without that checked I did not have internet access. Once I verified I did not have internet access I launched my web browser that I just coded and witnessed the same thing. With this tested I then re-enabled the proxy settings in Internet Explorer and repeated the test again. This time both Internet Explorer and the web browser I built connected to the internet. With the theory of my web browser using the cached credentials proven correct I moved on to actually sending data out through the proxy /firewall. To accomplish this I decided to use the “http post” command as it will allow me to submit data to a form over port 80 using the http protocol which is allowed through the proxy / firewall for authenticated users. To do this I found an old “shoutbox” script and used “live http headers” for Firefox to see how a post looked. Once I captured the posting header I broke it down in my application into 2 parts. Part one was the post string and part 2 was the data I recorded from user input. Once I clicked the execute button the data was posted to the shoutbox application and my theory was proven fact.

To double verify my theory I ran a second set of tests:

Test 2: Using Raw packet tools to test my theory.

Without firewall rule allowing me to bypass the proxy

C:\>nc -vv xxxx.net 80

DNS fwd/rev mismatch: xxxx.net != lambda.xxxxxxx.com

xxxxx.net [xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx] 80 (http): TIMEDOUT < — Failed

sent 0, rcvd 0: NOTSOCK

As you can see when I have to use the proxy Netcat can’t automatically authenticate to the proxy hence my http connection to xxxxx.net fails.

With firewall rule allowing me to bypass the proxy

C:\>

C:\>nc -vv xxxxx.net 80

DNS fwd/rev mismatch: xxxx.net  != lambda.xxxxxx.com

xxxxxx.net [xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx] 80 (http) open <– Worked

C:\>

As you can see with the rule allowed in the firewall to allow me to bypass the proxy and use the firewall the Netcat application can connect via http to xxxxx.net since it does not have to authenticate.

In the wild a malicious person could use a vulnerability in Internet explorer to download the application and execute it in the background or they could email it to a user and have them run it. The application does not require admin rights all it needs is the ability to use Internet Explorer.

I will upload the POC once I show the company my findings later this week. IP and URL’s have been altered to protect them.

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

The IRS has partnered up with China to help you get a tax bonus!

As some of you know my day job has me providing security guidance to a large user base that vary in their technical skills. Every day we get several requests that come in asking us weather something is a scam or phishing attempt and when time allows we do the research.

Today’s phishing question had to do with the following email:

From: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) [mailto: taxrefund@0x6c.3xdb24d6.irs.govThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it ]
Sent: Tuesday, May 20, 2008 7:25 AM
Subject: Tax Notification

Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
United States Department of the Treasury

Dear Taxpayer,

After the last annual calculations of your fiscal
activity we have determined that you are eligible
to receive a tax refund of $184.80.

Please submit the tax refund request and allow us
6-9 days in order to process it.

A refund can be delayed for a variety of reasons.
For example submitting invalid records or applying
after the deadline.

To access the form for your tax refund, use the following personalized link:

http://0x7C.0xDB11D1/www.irs.gov/

Regards,
Internal Revenue Service

Document Reference: (0x7C.0xDB11D1).

I did some quick initial research and replied to the end user with the following information:

From: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) [mailto: taxrefund@0x6c.3xdb24d6.irs.govThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it ]
Sent: Tuesday, May 20, 2008 7:25 AM
Subject: Tax Notification

Unfortunately we do not have the full headers here so I cannot confirm or deny the email address above. But I can tell you just looking at it does look real suspicious.

Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
United States Department of the Treasury

Dear Taxpayer,

The IRS knows you and would address you by your full name. IE John Smith  not Dear Taxpayer

After the last annual calculations of your fiscal
activity we have determined that you are eligible
to receive a tax refund of $184.80.

Please submit the tax refund request and allow us
6-9 days in order to process it.

In the past whenever the IRS has owed a individual additional money / rebates they never required additional requests. IE the recent bonus rebates.

A refund can be delayed for a variety of reasons.
For example submitting invalid records or applying
after the deadline.

To access the form for your tax refund, use the following personalized link:

http://0x7C.0xDB11D1/www.irs.gov/

This web address is bogus. The IRS real site is http://www.irs.gov. If you Google the address you will find these links http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=0x7C.0xDB11D1 showing that this is indeed a scam.
According to this site the url no longer works though I do not suggest you click it. http://www.phishtank.com/phish_detail.php?phish_id=448690&frame=site. That link will allow you to see the site in a protective format if you hover over the links on the site you will see that many of them do not go to the IRS site.

It is my believe that the 0x7C.0xDB11D1 is another url encrypted with hexadecimal (a computer language) that basically uses some form of cross site scripting, site spoofing, or redirection to steal your information.

Regards,
Internal Revenue Service

Document Reference: (0x7C.0xDB11D1).

Though the response above works for our end users this interested me so I decided to research this further. I figured looking at the URL that the phishers have came up with a new way or was using an old way that stilled worked to obfuscate the URL.

(Before doing any of the below please make sure you are using a live boot cd or a machine that you do not care about. I am not responsible if you infect yourself.)

So first I wanted to decrypt the URL http://0x7C.0xDB11D1. So using a hexadecimal conversion sheet that I found at http://www.dewassoc.com/support/msdos/decimal_hexadecimal.htm
I was able to translate the obfuscated URL to the IP address 124.219.17.209. You could also decrypt this by using the ping –a command. It will resolve it to the IP address.

Second I used Wire shark to capture traffic to and from the site to see if it used any droppers or scripts for redirection or infection. I did not see anything out of the ordinary.

Third I used Firefox and the Live Http Headers plug-in to capture traffic to and from the site to see if there were any scripts or redirection taken place and I did not see anything.

Fourth I manually analyzed the source code of the http:// 0x7C.0xDB11D1/ and the redirected site codes and did not see anything in the code that was obfuscated or out of the norm. The hacked pages pulled a lot of the IRS images and style sheets to make it look like the real thing but the attacker did an extremely poor job of hiding the URL. The URL clearly is not that of the IRS.

Fifth I manually tried to change the URL instead of using http:// 0x7C.0xDB11D1/www.irs.gov I tried http:// 0x7C.0xDB11D1/www.digitaloffensive.com and I got a page cannot be found error. This makes me believe that on the site http:// 0x7C.0xDB11D1 (124.219.17.209) there is a subfolder called www.irs.gov that has a file in it that does the redirection to random sites. I say random sites because during my analyst of this issue two different redirected hacked URL’s showed up. I tried to mirror the site http:// 0x7C.0xDB11D1 with wget –rm http:// 0x7C.0xDB11D1 but most of the directories cannot be accessed. I even tried to mirror it by doing wget –rm http:// 0x7C.0xDB11D1/www.irs.gov/ and that was able to dl one of the other hacked sites but still not provide the redirection source.

In conclusion this is just another phishing scam where the attackers are relying on human stupidity to click on a link and supply their personal information to the attackers. Please head your IT / IS department warnings about Email scams as they are only trying to protect you from yourself.

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

More IRS Shenanigans

Today our director of Internal Audit dropped on my desk a printed email that looked exactly the same as the scam email I wrote about a few weeks ago in the post called “The IRS has partnered up with China to help you get a tax bonus!”. I figured since I had a huge increase in traffic since I did the original story from people searching for what 0x7C.0xDB11D1 was that I would do a follow up to help others out that may be seeing this for the first time.

This time however the amount is no longer 184.80 they are now saying you are entitled to a whopping 284.80 cents an increase of $100.00 dollars.

The URL has changed slightly instead of http://0x7C.0xDB11D1/www.irs.gov/ it is now http://2081062820/www.irs.gov/. The new URL uuencoded is http://124.10.127.164/www.irs.gov/. At the time of this writing it looks like the URL has been removed and is no longer working to con innocent people out of their information. To see how I decoded the URL please read the original story posted here http://www.digitaloffensive.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23&Itemid=2 .

The third change was the “Document Reference Number”. In both emails this number was just the obfuscated URL to make it look more official and lend assistance in making the phish fall for the bait easier. In the first mail the “Document Reference Number” was 0x7C.0xDB11D1 and in the second one it was 2081062820.

Once again only way for us to help protect our end users is through constant reminders and training.

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

I am not your Pal. How to detect PayPal-based phishing scams.

The term phishing originated by taking the term fishing, meaning to bait and catch, and using a language of the computer underground where they commonly replace the letter F with PH. Digital criminals use cunning techniques to trick their victims into taking the bait … hook, line and sinker! The victim usually ends up exposing themselves to identity theft, loss of funds and other unpleasant consequences.

Though many companies like PayPal and eBay take many security measures to protect you it’s the human factor, known as Social Engineering, which these predators are counting on. They’re hoping to trick you mentally into believing that they are who they say they are or if you don’t reply bad things will happen.

PayPal has published a list of common email phishing tactics and a list of ways to detect fake emails that can be viewed here:  https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=xpt/Help/popup/RecognizeSpoof-outside . We strongly suggest that you read this information on PayPal’s website in its entirety, as it is only 3 pages long, but could save you time and money down the road.

Let’s take a look at the following email and see if you can point out the tell-tale signs that it’s a fake. The most important thing to remember, no matter how the email looks, is if you’re unsure of the email’s authenticity manually type in the company’s website and contact them via the phone number found on their site. This assures that you aren’t tricked into a fake site that may contain a fake number.

Another thing to remember is that if you do not have a PayPal account then just delete the email as it‘s definitely a trick.

p1

Here are some tell-tale signs that will help you quickly identify a phishing attempt.

First, the From says PayPal Department but the actual email address is norelay@steelworks.orgThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it .  That’s not from the PayPal domain which should’ve been name@paypal.comThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it . There are ways to spoof the domain so just because the email has the real domain name don’t base its authenticity on just that.

Second, the message is addressed to Dear PayPal User. Though PayPal, eBay and many other large companies deal with millions, if not billions of people, they’ll always use the name that’s on your account. For example: John Bishop Smith or Jane Y Smith. They will never user a generic greeting.

The third tell-tale sign isn’t very noticeable to the naked eye. If you hover your mouse over the website address Outlook will either show a balloon pop up with the real website that it will take you to, if you clicked it, or it will show the real website address in the Outlook status bar at the bottom of Outlook.

p2

The website address in the pop up doesn’t look like https://www.paypal.com at all! This can also be spoofed through other means to make the pop up show a PayPal website address.

Fourth is the content of the email. The attacker is trying to persuade you with a false sense of urgency to click the link. It’s better to have your account suspended than clicking the link.

To summarize whenever you receive these types of emails it’s best to delete them and contact the company through a manual process to assure that you are not being tricked into falling for a scam. We suggest that you manually type in the PayPal address https://www.paypal.com            to verify any information or call them at 1-888-221-1161.

I provided you with a few tell-tale signs to help protect you from falling victim to these attacks. If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact me.

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Posted on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009 by Michael

Instant IDS v1.0

Instant IDS v1.0 is a custom shell script that will automatically download, configure and run Snort IDS and BASE web gui.

Though this script has been tested in-depth I the author do not guarantee it will work and or not harm your system. Since this is a shell script and can be easily edited I strongly suggest that you don’t download it from any site but http://www.digitaloffensive.com. Please note that IDS systems need to configure to properly work in your environment. Until they are tuned you may receive false positives.

This script has been tested in-depth on CentOS 5.0, Fedora Core 7 and Fedora Core 6. This script should work on any other Linux flavor that makes use of yum and chkconfig.

This script currently makes use of the snort 2.7 and the rules that were released with this version. We do not download new rules for you as Snort requires a user account to download newer rules. We strongly suggest that if you like the Snort product that you subscribe to their subscription rule base service to receive new rules faster.

What is needed?

a)      A default install of Linux with gcc (no need to choose http, mysql or anything like that)

b)      A Internet Connection

What Does Instant IDS provide you?

Instant IDS provides you with a fully functional IDS system in minutes. The script will download all needed services, libraries and packages that are needed. It will install and configure each of these items based on the underlying operating system. It will also configure and start the needed services based on user input. Once done it provides you with a fully working IDS system running Snort, MySql and BASE.

What are we planning to do in the future?

Since 96% of the script pulls the newest packages using yum we plan to make sure that we keep the script up to date as new versions of Snort, Base and Libpcap are released. We plan to make the script more customizable by introducing the ability to configure variables. We plan to add more advance means of error checking and improve the code. We also plan to have it lock down the box as much as possible based on user input. With all this said we rely on the users of the script to tell us what they like and don’t like and what they would like us to do in future releases.

How to use Instant IDS

a)      cd /root

b)      wget http://www.digitaloffensive.com/snort/snort.sh

c)       chmod 777 snort.sh

d)      ./snort.sh

e)      Answer the questions that you are prompted with. Please make sure that if you are using a subnet that you enter it as xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx\\/24 ß or whatever class it is.

f)       The wait value you enter will give you some time to make sure there is no show stopping errors, some warning are ok. This is only to be used if there is a major issue and a library or application does not install or compile. If you see a major issue press ctrl +c to cancel the rest of the install.

g)      Once instant IDS is installed we suggest you lock down your machine, here are a few examples:

a.       Firewall the machine.

b.      Disable root ssh access.

c.       Create a mysql root password.

d.      Update the systems patches

e.      Disable unneeded services.

This script is released freely we ask that you keep the original authors information in it though you have right to modify the script as you see necessary. This script may not be sold.

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